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 LAJOS JÁNOSSY’S REFORMULATION OF RELATIVITY 
THEORY IN THE CONTEXTS OF „DIALECTICAL 
MATERIALISM” AND TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC 
RATIONALISM*
László Székely 
 
ABSTRACT 
The late Hungarian physicist Lajos Jánossy is respected in international physics first of all 
for his results achieved in the field of cosmic radiations, but his work in the alternative, 
Lorentzian tradition of relativity theory is also of historical importance. As an adopted son 
of the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, Georg Lukács, he was socialised in a left-wing 
spirit. He formulated a philosophical criticism of Einstein’s theory in terms of dialectical 
materialism in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast to the new Soviet thesis valid in Soviet ide-
ology from 1955, he insisted that the positivist, Machian epistemological foundation deter-
minatively influenced the physical level of Einstein’s relativity theory and distorted its real 
physical meaning. He also rejected the anti-commonsense character of Einstein’s new con-
cepts of space and time and argued for the necessity of a commonsense-conform physics. 
However, in contrast to the Soviet critics of relativity theory of the Stalinist period, Jánossy 
never used ideology to destroy the scientific authenticity of Einstein’s theory, but, accept-
ing the Einsteinian-Lorentzian mathematics as one of the great achievements of the history 
of physics, he announced and successfully implemented a positive program of a common-
sense-conform, non-positivist, Lorentz-based reformulation of the theory. The social-
cultural background of Jánossy’s reformulation of relativity theory is characterised by the 
strain of two contradictory elements: on the one hand, his left wing, Marxist commitment, 
on the other, his socialization in Western, “bourgeois” science and culture. Through a 
Marxist, “dialectical materialist” criticism of the positivist, Machian aspects of Einstein’s 
theory as well as through his work for a commonsense–conform physics, Jánossy defended 
not only Marxism but also the classical tradition of scientific rationalism as an essential 
element of European culture. 
INTRODUCTION 
The late Hungarian physicist Lajos Jánossy occupies a special place in the history 
of physics in the socialist period of the East-European – Central European region. 
On the one hand, he is an internationally respected scientist whose monograph on 
cosmic rays written in the forties of the previous century is considered to be one 
of the basic literatures of the topic. On the other hand, in Hungary and the coun-
 
*  The author expresses his gratefulness to the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) for 
the support granted to his research (Project Number K 79-194) 
254 László Székely 
tries of the former “Eastern Block” he is remembered as a dogmatic Marxist sci-
entist, who under the influence of ideological prejudices commanded a sharp at-
tack against Einstein’s theory of relativity as late as the early Sixties when neither 
the Soviet nor the Hungarian Communist Party demanded such ideological ortho-
doxy and loyalty from scientists. Due to this received view about Jánossy’s activi-
ty as a physicist, after the political changes in 1989–1990 his approach to relativi-
ty theory was often cited as a horrific example of ideological intervention into 
physics. In the light of this it is a bit ironic that beside his results on cosmic radia-
tion also his works about relativity theory are much more recognized and respect-
ed in the Western countries than the works of those physicists who – in the name 
of pure science – defended Einstein’s relativity against him. So, for example, Bell 
in his study “How teach relativity” mentions Jánossy’s approach to relativity as 
one of the few acceptable discussions of Einstein’s theory1, and the Oxford phi-
losopher of physics, David Brown expresses his indebtedness to Lajos Jánossy in 
his excellent monograph entitled Physical Relativity, emphasizing the merit of the 
Hungarian physicist in this field2
In what follows, we will analyse the philosophical background of Jánossy’s 
work of relativity theory and place it in the context of the history of 20th century 
European science and culture. 
.  
LAJOS JÁNOSSY’S BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Lajos Jánossy was a leading personality of Hungarian physical research in the 
Fifties and the Sixties of the previous century. The characterization „leading per-
sonality” here means both his authority and reputation as an excellent scientist, as 
well as his institutional position in the government organization of science. After 
seizing power with the help of the Red Army then occupying Hungary, the Hun-
garian Communist government – following the Soviet pattern – established a new, 
grand institute for physical research and (although not a party “cadre”) Jánossy 
was offered the position of head of the cosmic rays department to be established 
in the framework of the new institute. As a matter of fact, in 1954 he was appoint-
ed deputy director, in 1956 director of the Institute and he served in this capacity 
until 1970. 
Jánossy returned to Hungary from Ireland, where he was a member of the In-
stitute of Advance Studies in Dublin, where he worked together with famous Aus-
trian physicist Ervin Schrödinger, under whom he had studied physics in Berlin.3
 
1  Bell, 1976. 
 
The fact that he accepted the position offered to him demands some explanation 
since in that period Hungarian intelligentsia typically moved into the opposite 
direction: educated people and scientific researchers attempted to emigrate to 
Western, democratic countries as long as it was possible. Jánossy returned to 
2  Brown, 2005, p. vii. 
3  Király – Nárayné 1987. 
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Hungary in 1950, when the Iron Curtain had already been “drawn down” and it 
was impossible to leave the country without the consent of Communist authori-
ties. 
Lajos Jánossy’s return to Hungary can be understood only considering his bi-
ographical data. He was born in a Hungarian village near Budapest in 1912 as the 
son of a Hungarian astronomer of Jewish origin who died relatively young and 
whose widow, Gertrud Bortstieber (a mathematician belonging to the first genera-
tion of Hungarian women with a university degree) married Georg Lukacs, the 
famous and controversial Hungarian Marxist philosopher. Thus Georg Lukacs 
became the foster father of Lajos Jánossy, which significantly influenced 
Jánossy’s intellectual development.  
After the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 Lajos Jánossy’s fami-
ly moved to Austria and then to Berlin. Instead of following in his stepfather’s 
footsteps in politics and philosophy, Jánossy became a physicist. He studied phys-
ics at the Humboldt University in Berlin in the Golden Age of twentieth century 
German (and European) physics, becoming a student of Edwin Schrödinger 
whose metatheoretical considerations on physics played a significant role in the 
formation of his approach to physical problems. While after Hitler’s rise to power 
his stepfather left Hitler’s Berlin for Stalin’s Moscow and lived there with his po-
litical and moral compromises, Jánossy moved to the opposite direction and in the 
1930s became a professor at Manchester University where he taught physics (and 
especially relativity theory). Later he did scientific research in the field of cosmic 
radiation as a professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Dublin and be-
came an internationally respected scientist in the field. His monograph on the top-
ic belongs to the basic literature on the subject even today.4 But Jánossy’s stay in 
Dublin had significance not only because of his scientific successes but also due 
to the fact that in this period his former professor Schrödinger was also working 
there, and so they could continue their informal metatheoretical discussions about 
the problems of modern physics.5
It is clear that Jánossy’s invitation to participate in establishing the Institute 
for Physical Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was due as much to 
his international reputation as a physicist as to the role his stepfather Georg 
Lukács played in Hungarian – Communist – ideological life. Although for the 
official Communist movement (that is, for the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and its East European allies) Lukacs was a problematic figure, the Hungar-
ian party needed his support and his international reputation as a philosopher in 
Western (especially German) philosophical life, as well as Lajos Jánossy’s scien-
tific knowledge.  
 
The biographical data above are of great significance concerning Jánossy’s 
activity as physicist and especially as a critic of Einstein’s theory of relativity. 
Namely, the critics of the relativity theory in the Soviet Union belonged to two 
specific groups. The first group consisted of physicists who had still been educat-
 
4  Jánossy 1948, 1950. 
5  See: Király – Nárayné 1987. 
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ed in the Russian, pre-revolutionary era and (for different reasons) joined to the 
Communist party after the revolution. Consequently, their physical education had 
still been determined by pre-Einsteinian physics. The second group was made up 
of young physicists and philosophers already educated in the Soviet period, who 
during the campaign against the Western, bourgeois ideology and cosmopolitism, 
launched by Stalin’s ideological leader, Zhdanov, attempted to take over the lead-
ership of Soviet physics from their older, respected colleagues. A greater part of 
these physicists were of peasant or working class origin or belonged to the new, 
“Soviet intelligentsia”. This means that they were neither of “bourgeois” nor Jew-
ish origin, which was significant as the campaign against cosmopolitism definitely 
included anti-semitic elements.6
Neither can Lajos Jánossy’s criticism of Einstein’s relativity be interpreted as 
an expression of his party loyalty. Although his first critical paper on Einstein’s 
concepts of relativity theory was published in 1952
 Now, Jánossy was a Jew, who had been educated 
in the Berlin of the thirties, when the city was the stronghold of Western physics. 
Later on he had worked at Western, “bourgeois” universities, and had achieved 
his scientific successes there, collaborating with Western scientists. Hence the 
sociological explanation which is convincing with respect to both groups of Sovi-
et scientists mentioned above is inapplicable to Jánossy’s antirelativistic position. 
In fact, his family and professional background was similar to that of Soviet phys-
icists who were defending relativity theory and were the target of the anti-
bourgeois, anti-cosmopolitism campaign in Soviet science. 
7, his major works on the topic 
were written only in the late fifties and the early sixties, a period when – after the 
passionate ideological debates of the previous decades – Einstein’s theory of rela-
tivity came to be recognized as a dialectical materialist scientific theory and, as a 
confirmation of the Marxist world view from the side of science, it became a fa-
vourite with official Marxist ideology.8
PARALLELISM AND CONTRAST BETWEEN JÁNOSSY AND THE SOVIET 
CRITICS OF RELATIVITY THEORY 
 While Jánossy occupied a high position in 
the institutional system of science in socialist Hungary, his critical work on rela-
tivity theory emerged in a period when the criticism of Einstein’s theory contra-
dicted the then officially accepted “Marxist-Leninist” doctrine. 
If we turn to the details of Jánossy’s approach to Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
then, apart from the criticism of the Einsteinian mathematical formalism, we en-
counter the same reproaches to the theory which had been formulated by Soviet 
critics:  
i) the theory uses anti-commonsense concepts; 
 
6  See e.g. Graham 1993: 147–148; Vucinich 2001: 91–116. 
7  Jánossy 1952. 
8  E.g.: Müller-Markus 1960, 1961; Graham 1972: 111–138; Székely 1987; Vizgin-Gorelik 
1987. 
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ii) it does not provide a genuine physical-material explanation for relativistic 
phenomena; 
iii) its concepts and explanations are determined by a Machian, subjectivist 
methodology.9
Furthermore, similarly to the majority of anti-Einsteinian Soviet physicists and 
philosophers, Jánossy also sought a solution to these problems in the direction of 
the Lorentzian ether-theory. Therefore he seems to be a follower of the Soviet 
antirelativistic tradition after this tradition had ultimately been defeated, and Ein-
stein’s theory came to be accepted as a ‘dialectical materialist’ theory by the offi-
cial communist ideology. However, this is only the surface. Despite all parallel-
ism, he represented a definitely new approach in Marxist criticism of Einstein’s 
relativity theory, for, in contrast to Soviet critics who focused on ideology, 
Jánossy announced and successfully implemented a positive program of a new, 
consistent, non-Einsteinian physical explanation for relativistic phenomena.  
 
JÁNOSSY’S METATHEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SCIENTIFIC 
RATIONALISM AND THEIR APPLICATION TO RELATIVITY THEORY 
In the foreword to his essential monograph on the topic entitled Theory of Relativ-
ity Based on Physical Reality Jánossy recalls his encounter with relativity theory 
as a young man as follows, 
I got acquainted with the theory of relativity at a comparatively early age – I read the famous 
popular book written by Einstein. Reading the latter I had difficulties with some of Einstein’s 
concepts; however, having been young and enthusiastic, I convinced myself in the end that I 
could understand those concepts – to prove this I tried to explain the theory to everybody who 
was interested. In the course of such attempts I learned the ‘language of relativity’ and I 
gradually ‘got used’ to the theory.10
Nevertheless, his enthusiastic feeling regarding the theory began to disappear and 
at the end turned into scepticism when he taught relativity theory to university 
students in Manchester: 
 
A certain bad feeling never ceased altogether. Many years later I read several years in 
succession a course of physics at the university of Manchester. My course contained also the 
special theory of relativity. As the years went on I developed a technique of presenting the 
subject so that in the end I could convince my students that they really understood the theory. 
However, as my technique presenting the theory improved, my own belief in the 
adequateness of the concepts vanished. In the end I became convinced that from the 
philosophical point of view the concepts had to be changed. Since about 1950 I have 
struggled with the problem of the reformulation of the theory…11
 
9  See eg.: Timiriazev 1925, Maximov 1953, Joravsky 1961 p. 279–287, Vizgin and Gorelik 
1987, Székely 1987, 1988. Graham 1993. 
 
10  Jánossy 1971: p. 13–14. 
11  Jánossy 1971: p. 14, italics added by the author. 
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Jánossy’s biographical data and this reminiscence exclude the application of 
Planck’s well known formula to Jánossy’s case. While according to Planck the 
opposition to new scientific theories follows from the conservatism of the old 
generation of scientists (a view incorporated into the philosophy of science by 
Thomas Kuhn and others), Jánossy belonged to the new generation of physicists. 
Initially, he as a young man was a devoted promoter of Einstein’s theory (which is 
in accordance with Planck’s view). When he later became its critic, he was an 
expert on it (which contradicts Planck’s claim). 
It is also clear that the recollection of his changing attitude to relativity theory 
is of philosophical significance: it is an indirect criticism of the attitude dominat-
ing modern physics which, (in Jánossy’s view) suppressing rational philosophical 
analysis, wraps the problematic, non-commonsense character of the new physical 
theories in a cloak of enthusiasm. In another study Jánossy is more explicit and 
reproaches mainstream physicists not only for uncritically accepting the conflict 
between modern physics, on the one hand, and common sense rationalism repre-
sented by everyday thought, on the other, but also for actually idolizing this fea-
ture of the new theories. In his ironic characterization of the situation, being non-
commonsense, or contradictory to everyday thinking, has come to be regarded as 
a merit, a criterion of scientific character.12
Jánossy’s metatheoretical starting point for his alternative notion of relativity 
theory (as well as for his approach to the theory of measurement and quantum 
theory) is the conscious rejection of this attitude. In his succinct formulation, “The 
scientific way of thinking cannot be but the dialectical refinement, deepening and 
futher developing of everyday thinking.”
 
13 Of course, the term “everyday think-
ing”, as well as the term “common sense” loosely connected with it, does not have 
a well defined meaning requiring no further clarification. However, in the context 
of the present paper we cannot discuss this problem14
Now the following question emerges: is Jánossy’s principle as a metatheo-
retical norm of theory-building not too strict? Does it not restrict too strongly, too 
drastically the possibilities of scientific knowledge? Jánossy does not discuss the 
, but it is appropriate to use 
these terms in an intuitive sense, since in the community of physicists and philos-
ophers of science there is a general consensus about the non-commonsense char-
acter of modern physics. The debate is not about whether 20th century physical 
theories correspond or run contrary to common sense and everyday thinking but 
how science and philosophy should relate to that character of new physics. 
Jánossy’s formula above is a possible answer to this situation and is based on the 
comprehension that what we are facing here is not a scientific but a philosophical 
question which should be answered at a metatheoretical level. By his answer 
Jánossy established a metatheoretical norm which we will refer to as Jánossy’s 
norm or Jánossy’s principle. 
 
12  Introduction to Jánossy and Elek 1963: p. 9–10. 
13  Ibid p. 9. 
14  In this regard see Székely 1987, 1988. 
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question in general. However, with respect to relativity theory, he answers it as 
follows: 
The best method to prove the thesis that scientific thinking is the dialectical improvement of 
everyday thinking is to point out that the whole complex of the theory of relativity can be 
built up by the means of neutral methods in conformity with everyday thinking. At the 
beginning of the (20th) century a great sensation was created by the statement that the 
scientific analysis of the experiments necessitates that we should break lose from the usual 
thinking and should introduce new »revolutionary« concepts concerning space and time. We 
are going to point out, by an objective and impartial analysis of the fact, that these sensation-
creating statements were unfounded.15
LAJOS JÁNOSSY’S REFORMULATION OF RELATIVITY THEORY AS A 
LORENTZ-LIKE EXPLANATION OF RELATIVISTIC PHENOMENA 
 
As is well known, Lorentz developed an explanation of relativistic phenomena 
based on the concept of ether. In his theory rods and clocks in relative motion to 
ether undergo physical changes: rods contract and clocks slow down according to 
the formulas of the Lorentz transformation. Consequently, in Lorentz’s theory we 
do not have anything to do with space and time but with physical processes: the 
theory describes the physical behaviour of clocks and rods in relative motion to 
the ether which functions as a physically privileged reference system. In this ex-
planation the Lorentz transformation (which forms the heart of the special theory 
of relativity) and the empirically observed relativity of inertial systems are only 
consequences (and not explanations) of physical processes occurring in bodies in 
relative motion to the ether. Despite the essential difference between the theory of 
Lorentz and that of the Einstein, in Lorentz we obtain the same predictions as in 
Einstein. Hence inertial systems are empirically equivalent not only in the German 
physicist’s but also in Lorentz’s theory. The difference between the two explana-
tions of relativistic phenomena arises only at the theoretical level, since Einstein 
in contrast to Lorentz rejects not only the empirical but also the theoretical possi-
bility of any privileged system.  
In what follows, we will refer to all theories based on Lorentz’s ideas as “Lo-
rentz-like” theories. Since a Lorentz-like theory makes the same empirical predic-
tions as Einstein’s special theory of relativity, every observation that confirms 
Einstein, also confirms Lorentz, so there is no possibility of choosing between 
them on empirical grounds. (As a matter of fact Lorentz-like theories may predict 
slight differences in comparison to the Einsteinian theory but these may be ig-
nored as unobservable effects.) Since the mathematical formalism of a Lorentz-
like theory is the same as that of Einstein’s theory, a Lorentz-like theory can be 
characterized as an alternative (non-Einsteinian) physical interpretation of the 
mathematical formalism of relativity theory, or – as Jánossy characterizes his own 
theory – a reformulation of relativity theory based on physical reality.  
 
15  Ibid. 
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While Jánossy’s basic ideas (the assumption of the ether as a privileged sys-
tem, the contraction of rods and retardation of clocks while in motion relatively to 
the ether) are the same as in Lorentz, he provides us with a conceptually and 
mathematically well-elaborated new version of Lorentz’s original theory which is 
also generalized to explain gravitational phenomena. That is, Jánossy promotes 
the Lorentzian alternative to Einstein’s special theory to offer an alternative also 
to the general one.16
SPACE-TIME, PHYSICAL REALITY AND THE RELEVANCE OF 
JÁNOSSY’S ANTI-MACHIAN POSTULATUM 
 
As far as the conceptual structure of Jánossy’s theory is concerned, it develops the 
Lorentzian explanation of relativistic phenomena within the framework of the 
theory of measurement. Measures as numbers are, Jánossy emphasizes, arbitrary 
human constructions with the help of which we as theory-constructing beings rep-
resent certain properties (“quantities”) of physical entities (for example the length 
of a rod or the rhythm of a periodical physical process). In his view, the basic 
problem of physics is how to grasp in terms of subjective measures the real, ob-
jective properties (quantities) of physical entities and the laws prevailing in the 
physical reality existing independently from us. This means that physics is sup-
posed to construct appropriate measures with which to express objective proper-
ties and laws. Jánossy calls these “appropriate” measures “distinguished 
measures”, which – as any other measures – are only arbitrary names for physical 
quantities but whose distinguished character is not “subjective” but determined by 
the “objective” physical world. According to his analysis, distinguished measures 
are characterized by the fact that in general both their sum and product (or in cer-
tain particular cases at least their sum) express significant physical quantities, that 
is, their sum and product also appear in our measurements and/or in the estab-
lished physical laws. For example, the sum of the usual measures of two electric 
charges E1 and E2 (expressed by measures say e1 and e2) will be equal to the 
measure we receive measuring the joint charge, while the product of e1 and e2 
appears in Coulomb’s Law.17
While this notion of physical quantities and their measures is open to contro-
versy, it is based on justified metatheoretical postulates well established in the 
history of physics and as such it may serve as a metatheoretical starting point for 
physical theories. Furthermore, it is clear that Jánossy’s definite differentiation 
between measures as arbitrary human constructions on the one hand and objective 
physical quantities on the other directly contradicts the Machian-positivist philo-
sophical background of Einstein’s notion of relativity and radically changes the 
physical meaning of the theory. The fundamental and far reaching character of 
this change becomes especially clear if in terms of the measurement theory intro-
 
 
16  Jánossy 1971. 
17  Jánosssy 1971: pp. 14–16, 72–93; see also Jánossy 1965. 
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duced by Jánossy we reinterpret Einstein’s “definition of time” in his classical 
study of 1905 presenting special relativity: what for Einstein is the “definition of 
time” that in Jánossy is only a construction of a system of temporal measures. 
Similarly, Einstein’s new concept of simultaneity which was considered by the 
received view to be a far reaching conceptual change demanding reconsideration 
of our fundamental temporal categories, is no more in Jánossy than a particular 
concept of simultaneity valid only in a given system of temporal measures.  
The measurement theoretical framework makes it possible for Jánossy to rein-
terpret the space-time concept of relativity theory and to illuminate the mystical 
character conferred on these entities by Einstein: “The Lorentz transformation 
produces in Einstein’s terminology the »transformation of time«; in our concept it 
gives the connection between two equally distinguished measures of time.”18 
Therefore the claim that Einstein’s theory is a theory about space and time is, ac-
cording to Jánossy, incorrect, for the physical laws expressed in the theory “have 
nothing to do with the structure of space and time”19 but describe the physical 
behaviour of physical entities. If the application of the Lorentz transformation to a 
distinguished (that is, physically relevant) system of measures of space and time 
results in another distinguished system of spatial and temporal measure (that is, it 
is applicable to physical reality in a similar way as the original) then in Jánossy’s 
context this property of the transformation cannot be explained by the “structure” 
of Einstein’s space-time, which is only a mathematical entity constructed from 
measures. The case is just the contrary; what needs explanation is the applicability 
of the Lorentz transformation and that of the Einsteinian space-time as a theoreti-
cal construction and this explanation should be given by relating our measures in 
terms of which we describe physical phenomena to physical reality which is inde-
pendent from our measures. And Jánossy’s reformulation of relativity theory pro-
vides us exactly with this kind of explanation: the physical applicability of the 
Lorentz transformation and, consequently, the empirical equivalence of inertial 
systems (that is, Einstein’s special theory of relativity with its Minkowskian 
space-time) in Jánossy follow from a physical process he calls “Lorentz-
deformation” (described by the formulae of the Lorentz transformation and in-
volving Lorentz’s contraction and retardation hypothesis) which physical entities 
undergo while they are in relative motion to the ether. Hence relativistic phenom-
ena emerge not due the structure of “space-time” but (in accordance with Lo-
rentz’s original idea) are generated in the physical interaction of two physical enti-
ties: the ether as a background physical field and the physical entity in motion 
relative to it. In this regard it should be also mentioned that Jánossy rejects the 
concept of the ether as an absolute, unmoving physical entity, as well as the con-
cepts of absolute rest and motion.20 His theory speaks only about motion relative 
to the ether.21
 
18  Jánossy 1971, 16. 
 
19  Jánossy 1971, 13. 
20  Eg. Jánossy 1971, 48–49. 
21  For a more detailed analysis of Jánossy’s reformulation of relativity theory see: Székely 2009. 
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As we have seen, the conceptual change and the new explanation of relativ-
istic phenomena in Jánossy’s theory follows from his anti-Machian starting point, 
that is, from the distinction between “measures” and the quantities “measured”. In 
this anti-Machian framework of the theory of measurement even the often criti-
cised allegedly ad hoc character of the Lorentzian ether disappears, and the 
Lorentzian hypothesis on the physical changes in the clock and rods appears to be 
a rational hypothesis, logically established by Jánossy’s analysis of the relativistic 
phenomena. Therefore the conceptual structure of the theory of the Hungarian 
physicist also reveals the intimate connection between the Einsteinian notion of 
relativity theory and Einstein’s Machian metatheoretical commitment, and points 
to the fact that the Einsteinian explanation of relativistic phenomena is philosoph-
ically not neutral: it does not follow necessarily from the nature of the physical 
world but rather is a consequence of Einstein’s (Machian) metatheoretical frame-
work. Thus Jánossy’s analysis of relativity theory based on the theory of measures 
as a metatheoretical framework confirms indirectly and without any ideological 
arguments the view of Einstein’s Soviet critics about the Machian character of the 
Einsteinian explanation of relativistic phenomena as well as the Soviet characteri-
zation of Einstein’s usage of the concepts of space and time as idealistic. 
Of course this did not mean that Jánossy saw allies in Soviet critics. On the 
contrary, he sharply criticised them for their inappropriate and at times dilettante 
approach liable to discredit Marxist philosophy and jeopardize the program of a 
rational reformulation of Einstein’s theory.22
COMMON SENSE AND “DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM” 
 
As already emphasized, the characterization of Einstein’s theory of relativity as an 
anti-commonsense theory was and is generally received in physics and philoso-
phy. Opinions begin to diverge only regarding the question whether physics and 
philosophy should or should not accept this new, anti-commonsense view of phys-
ical reality which first appeared in relativity theory and was later restated by quan-
tum mechanics and other developments in 20th century physics. The Marxist crit-
ics of relativity theory (including Jánossy, who beyond his alternative relativity 
theory also suggested a new interpretation of quantum mechanics23
On the other hand, a considerable part of Marxist scientists and philosophers 
(including the Bolshevik leader, V. I Ulianov, that is „Lenin”, who ranked Ein-
) shared a 
common conviction that this fundamental turn in the character of scientific theo-
ries was unacceptable since it did not only contradict the rational tradition of sci-
ence but also opened the door to irrationalism. This point of view is understanda-
ble considering that Marxist philosophy emerged in the rational tradition of 
European philosophy, a tradition strongly interwoven with the development of 
science.  
 
22  See e.g. Jánossy 1958: p. 98. 
23  See eg. Jánossy 1958; Király-Nárayné 1978. 
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stein as “a great reformer of natural science”24) welcomed Einstein’s new theory. 
Many of them held it to be a scientific realization of the principle of dialectical 
materialism and the demonstration that the laws of nature correspond to the views 
of this philosophy.25
... the principle of relativity of Einstein introduces very drastic and fundamental changes in 
basic physical concepts. The notion of space and time derived by us from our daily 
experiences are only approximations linked to the fact that in daily life we happen to deal 
only with velocities which are very small compared with the velocity of light.
 In this context even the anti-commonsense character of the 
new physics becomes understandable. Namely, if we consider our common sense 
terms to be of empirical origin (as the materialist epistemology of Marxist philos-
ophy supposes to be the case), then these terms will be inseparably connected to 
the macroscopic world in which we live. Therefore, it will be no more surprising 
if the worlds of extremely high velocities and the sub-microscopic relations of 
elementary particles are characterised with conditions and laws not corresponding 
to common sense. As Landau and Lifshitz write in their famous Course to Theo-
retical Physics: 
26
The pro-Einsteinian camp in the Soviet Union and the “socialist” countries de-
fended Einstein referring to this “dialectical materialist” interpretation of his theo-
ry and in the end relativity theory got ideological endorsement in this context.
 
27
From this point of view both Jánossy and the Soviet critics of relativity theory 
committed twofold errors. Firstly, they were too strongly confined within the old, 
mechanical physics and could not understand the physical revolution represented 
by relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Secondly, they could not understand 
the dialectical character of Marxist philosophy in an appropriate way and, conse-
quently, they erroneously identified Marxist materialism with old fashioned, 
“bourgeois” materialism. Even the non-Marxist historical reviews and discussions 
on the Soviet-Marxist criticism of relativity theory follow this train of thought. In 
their context Einstein’s critics appear as physicists and philosophers of inappro-
priate or limited understanding of Einstein’s new theory and its philosophical 
meaning, independently of whether their limitations followed from their commit-
ment to the old physics and the mechanical concepts of old materialism, or were a 
consequence of their insufficient education in physics and philosophy, or their 
loyalty to the party.  
 
However, as we have seen, this view is incorrect regarding Jánossy, who was 
an excellent physicist educated in Berlin in the golden years of the 20th century 
physics. Furthermore, it also ignores the fact that scepticism concerning the anti-
commonsense character of Einstein’s theory and the characterization of its expla-
nations as non-physical were not special phenomena of Soviet scientific and ideo-
logical life, but they always were present in modern physics and philosophy of 
science quite independent of Soviet conditions. The rejection of the “drastic and 
 
24  See: Lenin 1922. 
25  See e.g. Semkowskii 1926; Gessen 1928; Naan 1951; Alexandrov 1953; Vucnich 2001. 
26  Landau and Lifshitz 1959: p. 4. 
27  See e.g. Naan, 1951, Aleksandrov, 1953, Fock 1953. 
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fundamental” changes which Einstein’s theory brought into the physical world 
view as well as the demand for an alternative physical interpretation of Einstein’s 
mathematical formalism are considered as legitimate and rational views in physics 
and the philosophy of physics even today.28
THE CRITICISM OF RELATIVITY THEORY IN THE LIGHT OF  
THOMAS KUHN’S CONCEPT OF SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM 
 This fact makes necessary to leave 
the particular Soviet context of the relativity theory debate and turn to the general 
philosophical context of the problem.  
Regarding our topic, two ideas of modern philosophy of science are of signifi-
cance: the Duhem-Quine underdetermination thesis formed by Imre Lakatos on 
the basis of Duhem’s and Quine’s considerations and the concept of scientific 
paradigm introduced by Thomas Kuhn. 
The Duhem-Quine thesis calls our attention to the fact that empirical data 
never determine or verify the truth of a scientific theory, since it is always possi-
ble to interpret the same data by means of different theories. Hence in the evalua-
tion of scientific theories observational data in themselves never suffice; we also 
need pure theoretical (including philosophico-metatheoretical) considerations. 
The case of the Lorentzian and Einsteinian explanations of relativistic phenomena 
provides us with a nice and suggestive example of this fact. At the same time, this 
case represents a very special and extreme example of underdetermination, where 
the empirical equivalence emerges due the fact that both theories cover empirical 
data with the same – Lorentzian-Einsteinian – mathematical formalism and so 
theoretical freedom are given not simply with respect to the observations but also 
regarding and despite the well defined common mathematics of the theories. The 
empirical equivalence of the Einsteinian and the Lorentzian theories and by this 
the fact that there is no possibility to decide between them with the help of exper-
iments was emphasized even with such a devoted adherent and propagator of Ein-
stein’s theory as Max von Laue.29
As far as the Kuhnian concept of scientific paradigm is concerned, in an anal-
ysis of the Hungarian wing of the Soviet debate on Marr’s linguistic theory (a 
passionate controversy which perhaps was much more burdened by ideological 
prejudices and arguments than the confrontation about relativity theory), Vera 
Békés, a Hungarian philosopher of science called the attention to the significance 
of Kuhn’s theory in understanding the Soviet scientific debates. What in the 
standard approach seems to be a war between pure science as a rational enterprise 
on the one hand and ideology and politics on the other, in Kuhnian terms, Békés 
argues, it appears as a confrontation of two scientific paradigms. It is an incorrect, 
simplistic interpretation that the view defended by Marr’s followers was deter-
mined by ideological commitments and in this sense represented the priority of 
 
 
28  See e.g. Turner and Hazelett 1979; Duffy 1988; Brown 2005; Duffy and Levy 2008, 2009. 
29  See: Laue 1952: 10. 
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ideology over science. On the contrary: if we approach the case of the Marr con-
troversy in the framework of the Kuhnian philosophy of science, then it will be-
come clear that Marr’s followers were researchers committed to a linguistic scien-
tific paradigm. In their argumentation ideology appeared only as an outer factor 
with the help of which they attempted to strengthen the position of their scientific 
paradigm against the rival paradigm. In other words, Békés suggests, it was not 
science which was made by Marr’s followers into “the handmaid of ideology” but 
exactly the contrary: it was ideology that they applied as a weapon to defend the 
scientific paradigm they were committed to.30 Of course, taking into account So-
viet political and ideological conditions, it was not a morally neutral, innocent 
game but one that seriously jeopardized the possibility of free scientific research 
and even the personal freedom and life of the representatives of the rival paradigm 
who, in turn, were also compelled to draw the sword of ideology. Following 
Békés’s suggestion, the Kuhnian concept of scientific paradigms is also applicable 
to the debate on relativity theory. The physicists who criticised relativity theory 
were not blind followers of Marxist philosophy (wrongly or correctly interpreted). 
They were scientists adhering to ether based electrodynamics as a Kuhnian para-
digm, who – in the context of the Soviet ideological and political system – at-
tempted to strengthen their position with the help of ideology. What was problem-
atic was not their physical point of view but that they not only blurred the 
distinction between metatheoretical and/or philosophical analysis and ideological 
argumentation, but consciously appealed to ideology and through it to political 
power in the course of an intellectual debate.31
This Kuhnian approach also helps to understand the essential difference be-
tween Jánossy’s view and the argumentation of Einstein’s Soviet critics: despite 
Jánossy’s commitment to Marxist philosophy and the common points his own 
view shared with that of Soviet critics, he did not attempt to use Marxist philoso-
phy as an authority with the help of which the scientific authenticity of Einstein’s 
theory might be destroyed. Instead, he moved successfully in the direction of a 
conceptual analysis of the theory and accomplished a positive program of a new, 
Lorentz-like interpretation of relativistic phenomena. In Kuhnian terms, he did not 
attept to destroy the rival paradigm and strengthen his own with the help of ideol-
ogy but worked for the scientific improvement of his own paradigm.  
 In doing so, they jeopardized not 
only the followers of rival views, but also destroyed their own program. To use a 
picturesque expression, they stained their rational point of view with the liquid of 
political ideology which prevented them from providing an appropriate analysis 
and arriving at a clear understanding of the related problems and, consequently, 
even of their own point of view.  
 
30  Békés 1997. 
31  See: Graham 1993; Josephson 1991. 
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GEORG LUKÁCS’S INFLUENCE AND JÁNOSSY’S THEORY AS AN 
ANSWER TO IRRATIONAL TENDENCIES IN 20TH CENTURY CULTURE 
Jánossy’s summarizing monograph The Theory of Relativity Based in Physical 
Reality represents the attitude analysed above: despite the author’s commitment to 
Marxism, even such ideologically weak philosophical terms as “common sense” 
or “everyday thinking” are absent from the work. The only concept with philo-
sophical connotation occurring in the monograph is perhaps the notion of “objec-
tive quantity” which expresses his commitment to scientific realism (which is 
perhaps an ideology in the weak sense of the term, but surely not in the sense in 
which “dialectical materialism” served as ideology for the Soviet system).  
However, there is still a very definite ideological reference at the end of 
Jánossy’s foreword: an expression of gratefulness to his stepfather, Georg 
Lukács.32
Jánossy’s biography and his brief reminiscence about his changing attitude 
towards relativity theory inform us that the primary incentive for him to reformu-
late relativity theory did not come from Lukács’s philosophy. Furthermore, we 
also know that Edwin Shrödinger, his physics professor in Berlin and colleague in 
Dublin had significantly influenced his notion of physics. However, it was not 
even the German physicist but Jánossy’s personal intellectual experience of rela-
tivity theory which motivated him to work on the topic. Nevertheless, the 
acknowledgement to Lukács in the foreword to a physical monograph indicates 
that the discussion with his stepfather played an essential role in the formation of 
Jánossy’s metatheoretical views, helped him to discover and express in philosoph-
ical terms the reason for his intuitive “bad feeling” concerning Einstein’s theory. 
And this claim about the connection between Lukács’s philosophy and Jánossy’s 
approach to relativity theory is not just a suspicion or assumption of high proba-
bility. It is well known that after his Sturm und Drang period as a romantic-
existentialist philosopher enthusiastic for Kierkegaard, and also after his philo-
sophically “revolutionary-avantgarde” interpretation of Marxist philosophy in his 
work History and Class Consciousness, Lukács interpreted Marxist philosophy as 
the heir to classical bourgeois rationalism in an epoch when – due to the alleged 
crisis of capitalism – this tradition was disintegrating into positivist rationalism on 
the one hand, and bourgeois irrationalism on the other. This concept of Marxism 
became especially important for Lukács after Hitler took power in Berlin and the 
Comintern announced its Popular Front strategy, since he regarded the increasing 
influence of irrational philosophical tendencies as the most significant ideological 
basis for Nazism.
 It is true that his acknowledgement does not contain any ideological 
phrases. But does it not evoke the whole body of the philosophy of Lukács’s later 
years?  
33
 
32  Jánossy 1971, p. 17. 
 Paul Forman in his famous study argued that the popularity of 
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics was connected with the 
post-war intellectual atmosphere in the Weimar Republic; with the inclination of 
33  Lukács 1954. 
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the German intelligentsia of the epoch toward irrational trends of philosophy.34
Also well known is the significance the Hungarian philosopher attached to 
everyday life (“Alltagsleben”) and everyday thinking (“Alltagsdenken”, “Denken 
von Alltag”) in his Aesthetics as the origin and basis of every higher form of hu-
man spiritual activity, just as his analysis in which he shows how those higher 
forms (eg science and art) rise on a dialectical spiral from everyday life and think-
ing into their own spheres.
 
Even though Lukács did not deal with sciences, in his late period he defended 
rationalism exactly against these irrational tendencies emphasized by Forman. 
35
In his metatheoretical considerations, Jánossy never referred directly to Georg 
Lukács. However, his terminology, the central place of scientific rationalism in 
his thought and the connection he made between that rationalism and everyday 
thinking clearly show that Schrödinger’s influence and his “bad feeling” regarding 
relativity theory found conscious expression and formulation in his thought with 
the help of Lukács’ philosophy. As a matter of fact, the second chapter of 
Lukács’s Aesthetics can be read as a philosophical background and illumination of 
Jánossy’s metatheoretical principle connecting everyday and scientific thinking. 
Furthermore, Jánossy and Lukács were on common ground in their rejection of 
“modern” positivist rationalism which Lukács considered to be a result of the de-
cline and disintegration of classical rationalism and which, along with the irra-
tional tendencies of modern thought, was the main target of his philosophical crit-
icism in his Ontology of Social Being.
  
36 In terms of Lukács’ Ontology Jánossy’s 
project of a relativity theory to base Einstein’s original theory on “physical reali-
ty” appears as a project of the ontological interpretation of relativity theory and 
thus, in the field of physics as a special science, corresponds to Lukács’ philo-
sophical project of ontology. This connection between Jánossy and Lukács 
explicitely appears in Jánossy’s paper “Philosophical problems of the special the-
ory of relativity”, where the Hungarian physicist cites the ontological criticism of 
Einstein’s positivist notion of simultaneity by Nicolai Hartmann37
 
34  See: Forman 1971, 1987. 
, another signif-
icant representative of philosophical ontology in the 20th century and a favourite 
philosopher of Lukács in his later years. Lukács considered the elaboration of a 
new, materialist, “Marxist” ontology– continuing the best traditions of bourgeois 
thought – to be the most effective remedy against irrational philosophical tenden-
cies. Jánossy found the means of correcting the anti-commonsense character of 
relativity theory in its interpretation “based on physical reality”, that is, in its on-
tological foundation. In this sense Jánossy’s theory of relativity is an answer in the 
field of physics to those irrational tendencies in the European culture of the first 
half of the 20th century which were challenged by Lukács’s philosophy and which 
appear in Forman’s analysis as a decisive factor in the birth and swift reception of 
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
35  Lukács 1963; Megill 1969. 
36  Lukács 1984, 1986. 
37  In: Jánossy1963, p. 140–141. 
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CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 
Despite his commitment to Marxism and the high positions he occupied in the 
organisational structure of Hungarian science in socialist Hungary Jánossy did not 
immerse himself in politics and ideology; he was able to formulate his criticism of 
the Einsteinian notion of relativity in ideologically neutral terms. We have seen 
that apart from his intellectual ability this was due to his Berlin and Dublin years 
and the philosophical influence of his stepfather, Georg Lukács. These factors, 
that is, the experience of Western scientific life free from direct political or ideo-
logical intervention or pressure and his stepfather’s fairly autonomous Marxist 
philosophy with its emphasis on the continuation of the great tradition of Western 
rationalism, helped him to preserve his classical “bourgeois” education and his 
affinity for classical rationalism despite his commitment to the “revolutionary 
labour movement”. And this is the point where the ultimate cultural context of his 
theory comes to light. His work of relativity theory was motivated and determined 
by his socialization and education in the great tradition of European culture, char-
acterized by Marxism as “bourgeois”. This was the culture and education he en-
countered in his family and, paradoxically, it was present even in the influence of 
his revolutionist stepfather. And this was also the culture and education confirmed 
during his years in the West, in Berlin and Dublin. Both for him and Lukács, the 
revolutionary labour movement and Marxism appeared, respectively, to be the 
only social power and philosophy able to continue the positive elements of “bour-
geois” culture in an epoch when destructive tendencies seemed to increase. In this 
sense both Lukács and Jánossy were conservative thinkers despite their commit-
ment to a revolutionary movement. If Lukács’ philosophy attempted to give an 
answer to the tendencies of irrationalism which, according to Forman’s analysis, 
formed the cultural context of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, then Jánossy’s criticism of the Einsteinian version of relativity theory is an 
answer to the consequences of these tendencies inside physics, to the uncritical 
acceptance and cult of anti-commonsensism. In this sense Jánossy’s Lorentz-like 
reformulation of the theory of relativity is not merely a Marxist scientist’s theory 
determined by Marxist ideology, but also a theory defending classical scientific 
rationalism as an essential element of European culture. 
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